The dynamic of changes in the Arab world

For the Arab world, the experience of total defeat in 1967 was a seismic moment. It forced a rethink of politics across the board. As always, with plate tectonics, such movements take time.

Nevertheless, one could argue that between 1967 and 1979, the politics of Arab nationalism had been tremendously undermined by the failure of the Arab States to realise numerous goals. These included the liberation of Palestine, the development of modern institutions and industry and the establishment of a dignified position for the Arab world among world powers.

The reality of the Arab world in the 1970s stood in stark contrast to these ambitions. The region was fragmented, divided and weak. There were States coming under the control of autocrats who would suppress their citizens. Only a handful of movements had the courage of conviction needed. Indeed, only organisations inspired by the Islamic discourse were regularly challenging these autocratic States.

These Islamic movements became very powerful. They saw civil law as a device used to abuse the rights of Egyptians rather than defend them. As such, they appealed to social justice and a rule of law grounded in Islamic law.

This ethos makes for a compelling and potent appeal to a growing number of people in Egypt. Through this Egyptian model, Muslim Brotherhood affiliates gathered support in several other countries including opposition members in Jordan, Syria, Yemen, Libya and Tunisia.

These movements found it difficult to challenge the power of the State. This was a problem as governments were becoming increasingly powerful and repressive. Nonetheless, these Muslim movements got their first real sense of empowerment upon witnessing the strongest autocracy in the Middle East, Iran, being overthrown. Although it was not an Arab State, leadership in Iran fell to a revolution whose ideology was overtly Islamic.

At that time, Ayatollah Khomeini was, from exile, calling on Iranians to mobilise around a common set of Islamic beliefs. Per these beliefs, he urged them to overthrow the un-Islamic and godless government headed by the Shah of Iran and his forces.

Prior to the revolution, the Shah of Iran was supplied by the United States and maintained considerable military might. There was also the threat of the SAVAK, the feared secret police apparatus in the country, which inspired paranoia and distrust among citizens.

Following the Iranian revolution, there was a false sense of security in the Arab world. Many perceived a kind of cordon around Iran that would insulate the rest of the region from the overflow of these ideas.

However, the role model of the Iranian revolution was fundamental. It empowered and encouraged a rise of increasingly militant movements throughout the Arab world. These movements posed Islamic resistance to governments.

For example, there was soon a severe challenge to President Sadat in Egypt. Indeed, he would be assassinated in 1981 by one of these movements. On the other hand, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would turn Afghanistan into a kind of failed State. As such, it became a perfect launchpad for Islamist movements to test their jihadist ideas against a common enemy, the Soviet Union. In 1975, a civil war in Lebanon led to a breakdown in the State’s control. This turns Lebanon into an area in which increasingly mobilised Islamist militias will be able to perfect their skills against a secular order in a conflict zone.

In these areas, Islamist politics and Islamist militias are coming together to become a dominant force in shaping the ideology of the region. By the 1980s and 1990s, the politics of the area is no longer aligned with the Arab national dream. Instead, the Islamic alternative has been able to rally and mobilise a broad swathe of young people in the Muslim world.

This is especially true in the emergence of Al-Qaeda. Many Middle Eastern and North African young people will rally to the cause in Afghanistan and treat it as their training ground. From there, they begin bringing movements back home to change the Arab world that they believed had so deviated from the true path.

There were numerous consequences of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. To take Iraq towards elections, the Americans overthrew the Baathist regime. As such, the plurality of Shia Muslims comes to dominate at the ballot box.

Moreover, the American overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s government through de-Baathification roots out all Iraqis associated with the Baath Party in the government and military. This disenfranchises the Sunni ruling elite that had been in power under Saddam.

These elites had no interest in the emerging Iraqi State post-Saddam. They watched as Iraq was transformed from a presumed Sunni Arab State into a Shiite-dominated polity very similar to their old enemy, Iran.

As a consequence of these events, George W. Bush unintentionally had expanded the area of Iran’s influence. Iraq was now seen as a country whose place in the Arab world had been transformed forever.

The Arab States around Iraq began to talk about a Shiite crescent of Iranian influence. This region of influence is seen as extending through Iran to its long-standing ally Syria. It also extends through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon. As such, Iranian influence went right to the heart of the Arab Middle East and divided it in two.

From this, there emerges the hypercharged movement Daesh that would overtake Al-Qaeda in its appeal to disenfranchised young Muslims. These young people are rallied to a vision of a caliphal Islamic order. This order would topple legitimate secular States seen as unduly influenced by relations with the West. ISIS would now come to try and challenge the very foundations of that post First World War order established in that Sykes–Picot moment of carving up the Middle East.

ISIS was aware of their history. They claimed credit for shattering Sykes–Picot. The situation brings the first century after World War One full circle. Arab and Muslim actors begin actively targeting the unresolved agendas that were fragmenting their territory. The result is a dystopian vision of a future Middle East under caliphal authority. The international community and people across the Islamic world reject this brutal Islamist regime. Onlookers are appalled by the violence and the distortion of what they see as a peaceful and communitarian faith.

While the Arab world has known fragmentation and a high level of conflict in its recent history, I remain very optimistic. My optimism is grounded first and foremost on the human potential of the region.

After all, this is a region with extraordinarily high levels of tertiary education. The ability of the displaced people of the Middle East to build their lives around the world has been remarkable. Their resilience has earned them a reputation for their abilities in science and technology and trade and commerce.

The human capital is there. We can see that human capital mobilised, as it tries to address the political issues of the Arab world today.