Since the end of the Cold War, the great powers, including the United States and the United Kingdom, have gone to war far more frequently than they did before the end of the Cold War. With the loss of pacifist movements, which were once quite prominent, human rights is not focusing on the outbreak of war, even though it can sometimes help humanise the wars that do break out. An excellent example of this syndrome is the global war on terror, which has allowed almost unlimited – unbounded in space and unlimited in time – aggression while sometimes featuring big campaigns to make the wars more humane. Finally, consider the last example, which is the fate of democracy. Human rights, for very good reason, when they become the priority, don’t play well, don’t fit naturally, with democratic self-determination. In fact, the image in many people’s minds when they think about human rights is that of the vulnerable and weak minorities who need protection from majority politics. Human rights advocacy, as well as law, has very frequently been juristocratic. Its goal is to transfer authority over basic decision making, not to legislatures, but to judges.
In this case, one can worry that looking at human rights could leave us unprepared to engage as fully in the rough and tumble of assembling a majority coalition for whatever broad set of values we cherish. Very few of those who’ve advocated human rights understand themselves to be seeking majority consent through embedding human rights in a package of attractive policies so that, for instance, majorities won’t vote for right-wing populists, and instead will protect the weak and vulnerable as part of the interests they pursue for their own sake. In all of these ways, we can worry that the age of human rights has not been an untrammelled good. It’s selective and comes at a cost to other values and solves one set of problems, or tries to, while incurring other problems along the way.